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Korea Follow-Up Study 
Introduction 
1. Much of the Centre's information about the activities it has 
supported concerns events during and immediately upon completion of 
projects. There is relatively little knowledge about subsequent 
events in the years following the termination of IDRC involvement 
and support. Yet such knowledqe is central to an awareness of the 
extent to which the Centre is fulfilling its mandate. Its attempts 
to do this are based on the concept that relatively intensive 
interaction with, and modest financial support to researchers to 
work in their own environment can have a lasting effect on 
indigenous research capacity and contribute to the stock of useful 
knowledge in a country. Hence the basic questions of: What has 
happened to the researchers? What has happened to the results? 
What has become of the institution? have preoccupied the Office of 
Planning and Evaluation since its inception. This curiosity 
coincided with a desire on the part of the Science and Technology 
Policy program in the Social Sciences Division to take stock of its 
activities through a program review, containing an evaluation 
component. It was therefore agreed to follow-up on four Science 
and Technology Policy supported projects in Korea which had ended 
three to five years previously. 
2. The four projects were:- 
Science and Technology Policy Instruments 1973-78 $68,000 
Absorption and Diffusion of Imported Technology 1977-81 $73,000 
Biogas Technology : Social and Economic Evaluation 1978-79 $10,000 
Regional Adaptive Technology Centres 1976-80 $66,000 
The methodology involved discussion with program staff, review of 
file material, and a brief visit to Korea by a member of the Office 
of Planning and Evaluation to interview past project leaders and 
other team members, as available. 
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3. The results of this n dest investigation are reported in the 
following pages, treating each project separately under three main 
headings: 
INTRODUCTION - givinq the original objectives 
and a synopsis of the relevant 
background; 
PEOPLE information on the key 
individuals who carried out the 
activity and on what they are 
doing now; 
RESULTS - information on the output from 
the projects, whether the results 
were published, and the extent to 
which the knowledge gained was 
used. 
4. The exercise was discussed with the staff of the Science, 
Technology and Energy Policy Program and other members of the 
Social Sciences Division in May, 1984. The main issues and 
conclusions are summarized below. 
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Issues 
5. The overwhelminq impression gained from the study is one of 
vindication of IDRC's modus operandi. Compared to other ways of 
enhancing research and scientific capability - one of the 
Centre's principal corporate objectives - IDRC's approach is 
often characterized by: 
(a) small amounts of financial support; 
(b) a high degree of interaction between the people 
involved and the program staff, mainly aimed at 
facilitating indigenous definition of problems and 
research topics, and exchange of information and 
experience with people from other countries (two of 
the four projects were part of large network 
projects); 
(c) relatively little "overseeing" from the Centre, with 
a high degree of freedom for the researchers to find 
their own way. 
The important features of this case study are that for a total of 
$217,000 financial support, about 30 persons were provided with an 
opportunity to become involved with science and technology policy 
research related to their own environment and to meet, establish 
relationships with and learn from their fellow countrymen. 
Engineers worked with economists, professors with entrepreneurs, 
government employees with academics. Most important, most of these 
individuals are still living and working in Korea, nome in more 
senior positions, and one or two in positions capable of exerting 
considerable influence on scientific and technological development. 
To say this is far from claiming cause and effect, but a 
contribution to self-development and some "virtue by association". 
6. The benefits amount to something that is not adequately captured by 
the often used phrase "enhanced research capacity." There were 
contributions to teachinq; to the awareness of policy-makers; to 
the decisions made by people in charge of significant public 
corporations and private industry, to communication based on mutual 
respect among people with different skills being used in different 
ways to derive social and economic benefits from the application of 
science and technology. Having examined the activities from a 
national and local perspective, it is these locally specific 
outcomes that justify the efforts of the researchers, more than the 
more elaborately stated network or national objectives. The 
specific results of the research activities themselves were less 
important than the subsequent use which the people involved have 
made of their own enhanced knowledge and individual abilities as a 
result of conducting the research. 
7. Although specific information was not collected, the division views 
this set of projects as a good illustration of the three 
characteristics of IDRC's approach outlined earlier. In 
particular, in terms of the way the Centre employed all the 
resources available to it, a considerable amount of professional 
staff time was spent, especially during the project development 
stage. Intense interaction with the people to be involved took 
place through travelling to the countries to establish the 
networks, organization of workshops, in-country team meetings. 
These "setting-up costs" are considered to be a necessary condition 
to achieving the kinds of benefits discussed above. Certainly it 
is apparent that once this investment In time had been made, 
relatively small amounts of direct financial support generated a 
considerable amount of activity. However, an important question 
emerges which would require further research to resolve. It 
relates to the relative allocation of "settinq-up costs" (mostly in 
terms of staff time) between establishing the networks and 
developing national projects;,and to the relative allocation of the 
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correspondinq benefits arising from the network activities per 
se and the national efforts. This observer would propose the 
hypothesis that most of the benefits were derived from the 
nationally specific efforts in the-Korean case and were only weakly 
dependent on the networks; and that therefore the benefit:cost 
ratio for the investment in setting-up national activities was much 
higher than for the network. 
8. There remains also a strong impression of "unfinished business" 
that many of the people would welcome the further opportunity that 
some-financial support would provide to develop their ideas. This 
issue is difficult to treat separately from the question of the 
extent to which the Centre should continue to provide support to a 
country with Korea's level of wealth and research capacity. But 
the general question can still be raised : how, often does the 
Centre move on to the next institution in another country, when 
some form of additional assistance would consolidate previous 
endeavours, either with respect to building research capacity or to 
the useful application of the products of that capacity? In cases 
where the setting-up colts have been high, a better return on this 
investment can be obtained by providing further support; i.e. a 
phase II or III can take less staff time than a phase I. 
9. In three of the projects, the publications of importance were 
produced locally in the Korean language : a textbook on the 
management of technology used for university teaching; a booklet on 
biogas production; extension materials for small-medium cast iron 
industry. These were produced on individual initiative, mostly 
without intended Centre support. This can be taken as an example 
of the leverage that is often exerted by IDRC funding and of 
maximum scope given to local initiative. Again however, general 
questions arise : given the importance of indigenous capacity and 
locally specific knowledge, language and immediate dissemination 
become paramount. Are there occasions when there are no 
institutional resources for production of even (say) 100 
photocopies of a typescript in the appropriate lanquage for the 
community, and when the Centre has aimed too hiqh, at international 
distribution of a higher quality product? There are many countries 
in which the mort basic resources - paper, typewriters, 
photocopiers - are simply not available. The question of 
"quality" may merit a Gloser examination. Clearly any publication 
intended for international distribution under the Centre imprimatur 
should be of a certain standard, but for specific country needs, 
the output of a given project, while not of "international" 
standards, may be the only work in existence on that topic for that 
country. As such, it merits at least local dissemination, if for 
no other reason that to begin the process of quality improvement 
through peer review and criticism. 
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I SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY INSTRUMENTS : KOREA (1973-1978) 
($68,000) 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The original project summary was entitled "Technology Policy 
Instruments (3-73-018, 21 May 1973) and proposed the establishment 
of a network of vine countries, of which South Korea was one. A 
subsequent project (entitled "Science and Technology Policy 
Instruments") added another two countries, one of which did not 
participate, and the final list became Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
Peru, Mexico, Venezuela, Egypt, Macedonia, India, South Korea. 
2. The network was 2} years in the making and was a unique experiment, 
drawing together countries with very diverse socio-economic systems 
and culture, but united by a common objective of: 
trying to wake science and technology a 
more effective tool in development, 
(3-73-018, p.3). 
In each country, the project was supported by policy makers and in 
most countries it had been discussed at the ministerial level. 
3. The main advantage of the network was seen as the exchange of 
knowledge between the developing country national teams, with the 
aim of improving national policy-making. International comparative 
study and synthesis was seen as a secondary objective. 
4. A workshop in Barbados in early 1973 brought together science and 
technology policy makers and researchers from the ten countries. 
They formulated the following research objectives: 
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"The general purpose of the project is to gather, 
analyse, evaluate and generate information which would 
help policy-makers, planners and decision-makers in 
developing countries to specify the ways and means for 
orienting science and technology toward the achievement 
of development objectives. In particular, the project 
should help to: 
develop indigenous capabilities in 
science and technology appropriate to 
the countries' needs; 
better utilize these capabilities in 
the productive sector and other areas 
of socio-economic activity; 
improve the process of importing 
technology in such a way as to 
maximize its beneficial effects and 
minimize its detrimental effects; 
absorb and adopt the imported 
technology linking it to the 
indigenous scientific and technical 
activities." 
5. In each country, the project was to be conducted in four phases. 
Phase 1 : a general diagnosis of the state of science and 
technology in the country, to provide background 
information against which to assess the relative 
effectiveness of different instruments of policy 
implementation. 
Phase 2 : an examination of the rote of government in the 
formulation and implementation of science and technology 
policies. Both explicit science and technology policier, 
and the implications for science and technology inherent 
in other (= implicit) policies were to be considered. 
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Phase 3 : empirical case studies, based on productive units, to 
test the effectiveness of alternative mechanisms and 
instruments for implementing science and technology 
policies. 
Phase 4 : empirical studies of the effect that mechanisms and 
instruments for implementing science and technology 
policies have on the behaviour of agencies that produce 
scientific and technological knowledge. 
These are the bones of the methodological guidelines provided by 
the field co-ordinator's office, but each country team was 
encouraged to pursue the research in a way that ensured maximum 
interaction with policy-makers in their own country. Thus 
international comparability was traded in favour of national 
applicability and impact. 
6. The South Korean team was based with the Korean Advanced Institute 
of Science. This choice was made by the Minister of Science and 
Technology, Mr. Choi, following discussions with IDRC. The Korean 
team was strong and contained mostly professionally trained 
engineers. The team followed the methodological guidelines more 
closely than any of the other countries and the quality of the work 
was consistently high. The co-ordinator of the Korean group was 
Dr. KunMo Chung, a personal friend of the Minister of Economic 
Planning, and Director of the Science, Technology and Society 
programme of the Korean Advanced Institute of Science. Thus, as 
reported briefly in the project completion report, the impact on 
policy-making was considerable, since Dr. KunMo Chung and the 
Minister held frequent meetings to discuss project activities and 
ideas, and on several occasions the products of the discussions 
found their way into statements of Korean government policy. 
PEOPLE 
7. Dr. KunMo Chung became Vice-President of the renamed Korean 
Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, a key research and 
educational agency. Between 1970 and 1981, it trained 1488 
scientists and engineers, and plans an expansion of its PhD and 
Master's programs between 1982 and..1986 to 550 and 2790 graduates 
respectively. 
He provided the retrospective view of the project and information 
about subsequent events. 
He himself was introduced to engineering during the project and has 
became President of the Korean Power Engineering Company, Inc. It 
was established in 1976 to foster the country's self reliante in 
power plant engineering, particularly in nuclear power plant 
technology. It employs 700 engineers and specialists and is a very 
powerful factor in Korea's economic development. The company has 
grown rapidly in recent years and is currently engaged in a ten 
year project to produce a standardised reactor design for Korea. 
Dr. Chung is one of a small group of the mort senior scientific and 
policy advisors to the President of the country, and relishes the 
opportunity to put the project ideas and experience into practice. 
Dr. Dok Yoon was a specialist in high pressure physics when he 
joined the project team. During case study work in the project, he 
switched interest and allegiance to powder metallurgy as being more 
relevant to Korean development. He is now the leading scientist in 
this field in Korea and is Professor of Material Science at the 
Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology. He is 
recognized as one of the three best scientists in the world in 
powder metallurgy. He is keenly interested in science policy and 
is Secretary General of the Korean Science Foundation. 
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Or. Kim joined the team'as an economic consultant with a PhD from 
Stamford University. The project experience provided him with a 
science and technology basis for his work. He is now Chief 
Secretary on Economic Affairs to the President of Korea. 
Mr. Song was a full time research assistant on the team as a 
chemical engineer. He was in fact the only full time person. He 
subsequently became Chief of Planning for the Korean Standards 
Research Institute, and developed considerable expertise in the 
running of a scientific institution. He now works with Dr. Kim as 
Secretary to the President on Scientific Affairs. [Dr. KunMo Chung 
considers his development to be a real product of the project]. 
Dr. Shin was a research associate with the project and is now 
Professor of Statistics at Korea University. 
Dr. Lee of the Korean Development Institute is now a specialist 
with the World Bank. 
Mr. Cho was a section chief at the Ministry of Science and 
Technology and is now Assistant Secretary of that Ministry. 
Dr. Suh of Korea Univesity is now Minister of Energy and 
Resources. He was loosely associated with the team. 
RESULTS 
8. In retrospect, Dr. KunMo Chung feels that the direct impact on 
policy of the team's work did not meet the hopes that lay behind 
the chosen emphasis on "action-oriented" work. Policy research is 
a peculiar animal with perhaps the greatest usefulness lying in 
giving opportunities to unproven people and broadening their 
outlook : the engineers began to understand the contextual social 
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and economic implications of technology; and the "soft" scientists 
derived a great appreciation of technicalities. To a certain 
extent it is unrealistic to expect direct policy impact, but the 
indirect effects of self-reliance and self-improvement can be 
considerable. Dr. Chung would rather describe the project as a 
self-teaching experience than as research. 
9. Or. Chung's serious illness and local political factors constrained 
dissemination efforts. The Ministry of Science and Technology did 
not place great value on the project most support came from the 
Economic Planning Board. In the Korean context, science and 
technology policy people have to be attached to the Economic 
Planning group, not the Ministry of Science and Tecnnology. 
10. As a specific example of effect, the government policy group 
deliberating on telecommunications technology for the country used 
the project team as a sounding board for the proposai to adopt an 
electronic switching system. Subsequently this system was adopted. 
II ABSORPTION AND DIFFUSION OF IMPORTED TECHNOLOGY (1977-81) 
($73,000) 
INTRODUCTION 
This project was one component of a network designed to analyse the 
absorption and diffusion of imported technology in seven Asian 
countries. The Centre had two general objectives : first, the 
training objective, to encourage and support researchers to 
understand a complex economic area; second, the research objective, 
to allow the researchers to establish some preliminary results. 
The research objectives were stated as follows: 
(i) to examine the pattern of technology transfer and 
adaptation at the firm level in vari3us industrial 
sectors; 
(1 i 
(iii) propose policy changes which allow technology absorption 
and adaptation to cohere more appropriately to national 
goals." 
to explore the way that imported technology changes (both 
for the sector and the enterprise) manufacturing, 
training and commercial perspectives; 
These objectives were considered to be ambitious, and the training 




Dr. Woo Hee Park, Professor of Economics, College of Social Sciences, 
Seoul National University. 
Dr. Moo Ki Bai, Associate Professer of Economics, Seoul National 
University. 
Or. Suck Chul Yoon, Professor of Management Science, School of 
Management, Seoul National University. 
2. Ail three of the above are still with Seoul National University. 
Or. Park was ill during the visit and brief interviews were 
conducted with Drs. Bai and Yoon. It was not possible to obtain 
information on the other five of the eight persons in the group. 
RESULTS 
3. The co-ordinating consultant, Dr. Enos, and the project leader Dr. 
Park, are working on writing and revising a report for publication. 
4. Dr. Park and Dr. Yoon contributed papers to a workshop in Singapore 
in 1981 (IDRC - 171e). 
5. Dr. Bai worked on the nylon textile case study with a fellow 
professor of engineering, Dr. Kim, who had good contacts with the 
company through lecturing and consultancy work. They made visits 
and used a tape recorder extensively to gather information. Dr. 
Bai found that he (the economist) and Dr. Kim (engineer) 
complemented each other well and the study results were very 
revealing to them. 
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He found the experience gave direction to the extension of his 
research activities, as it did for the other researchers, e.g. Dr. 
Yoon (see below); and Dr. Park published a book in Japanese using 
some of the project results. Dr. Bai presented the findings of his 
case study to a United Nations University Conference in 1980. 
5. Or. Yoon makes extensive use of the project results in his 
teaching. He has designed a new course in Technology Economics and 
uses teachers from different colleges. He has written a book 
"Technology Accumulation and it's Management", using many ideas 
from the project. It has been published in Korean and is used in 
class work. The private sector and the government recognize him as 
a source of specialist knowledge and he is called upon by both for 
advisory work, formai lecturing, and seminars on technology. The 
Ministry of Science and Technology and the Economic Planning Board 
use his services. He intends to broaden the scope of the book to 
include consideration of management skills, and to publish it in 
English. 
6. The results of each of the four case studies were also published in 
the Quarterly Journal of the Economics Research Institute, which 
receives wide circulation to universities. 
7. Both Drs. Yoon and Bai emphasized the value of indirect effects 
through self-development, into teaching and other research, as 
opposed to direct impacts of the research results per se. Dr. Yoon 
considers that the publication of his book locally was essential to 
impart the information to government and industry that a source of 
expertise in this area existed. 
8. The Science Policy Research Unit Workshop in Sussex was important 
to both Drs. Bai and Yoon in opening up the subject to them and 
providing a lot of information and material. There was a sense 
that the course was too directive for an infant "discipline". 
I1:4 
9. The project was originally funded as part of a network, with 
similar work conducted in the Philippines, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
India, Bangladesh. Dr. Yoon assessed the performance of ail but 
Korea and India as disappointing. The rate of progress was highly 
variable among the teams - a reflection of the too heterogeneous 
mix of team compositions. For example, Korea was represented at 
the professional level, whereas other countries had lover level 
government officiais or people from profit making research 
institutes with different attitudes and levels of academic 
achievement. 
III SIOGAS TECHNOLOGY : SOCIAL AND ECON0MIC EVALUATION (1978-79) 
($10,000) 
INTRODUCTION 
1. This project was preceded by a "state of the art" review of the 
field of biogas technology (3-A-76-4099), followed by a project 
identification meeting in Colombo, Sri Lanka on "The Social and 
Economic evaluation of Biogas Technology," (3-A-76-4158). 
Following this meeting, seven institutions in five Asian countries 
submitted projects. It was subsequently decided to initiate a 
network of projects stressing the development of research 
capability in Asian institutions in the area of the social and 
economic aspects of technology theories at the village level. 
Hence the project objectives were stated as being twofold: 
"Firstly, to enable participants to develop a research capability 
in providing the technical R&D process with an understanding of the 
social and economic characteristics of the rural environment in 
which a particular technical innovation is to take place. This 
capability will stress the appraisal of technical options on the 
basis of their likely social and economic effects in different 
environments. 
Secondly, to develop and apply a methodology which will provide 
information and analysis of the social and economic value of 
installed biogas plants and on the energy characteristics of 
selected rural areas in which the further application of biogas 




Dr. Jae Won Chung , Office of Rural Development, Suweon. 
Dr. Young Dae Park , Head of Rural Energy Resource Research Division, 
Office of Rural Development. 
2. Dr. Chung was not available, but Dr. Park substituted for him. He 
was able to give some summary information about the people involved 
in the project. 
Dr. Chung is now in the "private sector" (see below). 
Dr. Park is now head of the Agricultural Chemistry Division, which 
is carrying on the biogas work of the now defunct Rural Energy 
Resource Research Division. 
Dr. Hong is a profesor of sociology at Hanyung University. He was 
a senior research worker in the project. 
Dr. Pan is a professor of economics. 
Dr. Han is at the Farm Machinery Institute. 
Dr. Lee is Professor of Economics at Seoul University. 
3. This very sketchy information can only be amplified by some more 
detail on Dr. Chung, relayed by Dr. Park. 
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Or. In Hwon Kim who, as Director General of the Office of Rural 
Development, was the official recipient for this small project, was 
a keen proponent of biogas. 
Between 1969 and 1975, the Korean Government, through the system of 
provincial Rural Guidance Bureaus, implemented a subsidised program 
of installation of 28,000 small biogas units in rural Korea. For 
various reasons, among which was a switch to propane, kerosene and 
briquettes as rural incomes rose, acceptante of the biogas units 
was poor, and diminished over time. The Rural Energy Resource 
Research Division investigated the acceptante probl-ems through Dr. 
Park. Subsequently, Or. Kim attempted to design a larger community 
digestor unit suitable for village production and winter supply of 
biogas. In 1979, such a unit was costed at US $27,000, using solar 
panels. It was proposed to the government in 1980. 
Political events following the assassination of President Park led 
to the removal of Dr. Kim from his position and the closure of the 
Rural Energy Resource Research Division. The new administration 
viewed the village level unit as too costly. Attempts are now 
being made to develop a cheaper smaller unit again, more suitable 
for use by the Korean farmer. A prototype using compost under a 
plastic sheet has been produced. It has received coverage by the 
Korean Broadcasting Service and President Chun is reportedly 
enthusiastic. About 900 units have been disseminated at an average 
unit cost of US $250. 
It appears as though the same forces that removed Or. Kim from his 
position also impinged upon Dr. Chung, the project leader. His 
departure from the Office of Rural Development occurred at the same 
time as Dr. Kim's. 
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RESULTS 
3. Dr. Chung produced a final report in 1979, entitled "Biogas in 
Korea". This was also published in Korean in booklet form out of 
project savings. The number of copies made is uncertain (perhaps 
100?), and circulation seems to have been confined to libraries. 
4. Dr. Park is keen to have the results of his work published by 
IDRC. 
5. it is Dr. Park who has been leading the subsequent work on the new 
digestor. He presented the results of his work at a conference* on 
agricultural waste management technology in 1982. The project 
looked at household energy needs in Korea and helped to identify 
what was wrong with the previous small digestor technology. This 
led to the new compost digestor. Dr. Park has been supported by 
the United Nations as a technical advi.aor to Turkey, and by the 
German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) to attend an 
international workshop. Other Asian countries and agencies such as 
the International Rice Research Institute have also shown great 
interest. 
6. His view on the small amount of money provided by IDRC was that 
money is the key to unlock the time constraint. If he has funds, 
he makes time to do research. 
*"Technology Utilization and Management of Agricultural Wastes" (1982) 
Ed. S.A. Salam Abang Abdullah Abang Ali 
Regional Seminar, University Pertanian, Malaysia, 15-17 September 1982. 
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IV REGIONAL * APTIVE TECHNOLOGY CENTRES (1976-80) 
($66,000) 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The concept of the Regional Adaptive Technology Centre was 
developed in a number of Asian countries in the 1970's as a way of 
harnessing the capabilities of non-metropolitan universities to 
encourage technical change in local production sectors. The 
Centres were seen as specific frameworks within the universities 
that would cut across disciplinary boundaries and co-ordinate a 
complex of necessary activities including research, technical 
development, policy formulation, and extension to industry. 
2. Yeungnam University in South Korea was one of three universities to 
have formally established a Centre within its organizational 
structure. The University conducted a feasibility study to 
identify the production sectors on which to focus its efforts, to 
outline the methods for dealing with the problems, and to make a 
preliminary assessment of the practicality and utility of 
implementing a program for changing technology. The Regional 
Adaptive Technology Centre at Yeungnam developed a three year 
program, split into two eighteen month phases. The first phase was 
presented to IDRC as a project. The Technology Centre chose two 
sectors of manufacturing activity : the production of quartz 
crystal resonators; and small and medium scale iron and steel 
casting. 
3. The objectives of the project were: 
to identify problems that necessitated changing the existing 
technology; 
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to identify constraints to technical change posed by 
enterprise management or national/regional policy; 
to specify a set of actions for promoting technical change 
that could be undertaken at various levels from the individual 
firm up to the national government; 
to define how the regional Adaptive Technology Centre 
component of a technical change program could be implemented; 
to estimate what benefits could arise from the changes. 
PEOPLE 
Name During Project (1976-79) 1983 
Ki Ho Chung Director of Regional Adaptive Professor of 
(Project Technology Centre, Yeungman Electronics and Dean 
leader) University. of Engineering 
College, Yeungnam U. 
Gyong-Chan Kim Professor of Civil Engineering, Director of the Inter- 
Yeungnam University. national Division of 
Yeungman University. 
Quartz Crystal resonator subproject 
Mu Young Lee Professor of Elecronics, (same position) 
Yeungnam University 
In Hyon Woo President of Korea Crystal (same position) 
Company Limited 
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Iron and Steel casting subproject 
Ki Sul Lee Professor of Mechanical (same position) 
Engineering, Yeungnam 
University. 
Rak Won Kang Professor in Department of (same position) 
Casting Industry, Yeungnam 
University. 
Management and policy subproject 
Jong-Sup Kim Professor, Department of Public (same position) 
Administration, Yeungnam 
University 
Byung-Tae Yun (ditto) Director of a 
provincial project of 
the Regional Adaptive 
Technology Centre. 
Sung-Kyu Park (ditto) Dean of Finance of 
Yeungnam University 
Won-Dal Lee Professor, Department of Same position, on 
Economics, Yeungnam University one year study leave 
in U.S.A. 
4. The project leader, Professor Ki Ho Chung, provided the above 
summary of the subséquent careers of the key people involved in the 
project. In fact, there is very little change, e.g. all staff are 
still with the University and most are in the saure positions. 
Professor Ki Ho Chung is no longer Director of the Regional 
Adaptive Technology Centre, which does not now have the office 
which it had during the project and which appears to exist in name 
IV:4 
only and in a loose network of contacts within the University. 
Professor Nu Young Lee worked with three quartz crystal firms 
during the project and now has contacts with about twenty in the 
area. Three of these are very large and the remainder are small. 
Recent technological shifts and structural changes in the industry 
have caused the disappearance of some firms in the region that were 
originally established on the strength of a virtually free supply 
of raw materials from the military surplus of the Korean war. 
Professor Lee mostly employs his project experience in his 
post-graduate teaching. He has only limited testing facilities in 
his offices at the university. The extent of his field work 
appears to be limited by this fact and by his teaching load. 
5. Professor Ki-Sul Lee is still quite actively employed with 
extension work with 20 to 25 iron and steel foundries in the 
region. During the project, Professor Lee worked mainly with two 
firms with 80 to 100 employees. One of them - the Dae Han Cast 
Iron Co. Ltd. - now employs 300 people and has expanded operations 
to two sites. Output has risen from 200 to 1000 tonnes per month, 
with a much wider range of Items. Relations between this firm and 
the university, personified by Professor Lee, are clearly extremely 
good and mutually beneficial. During the project Professor Lee 
carried out a series of basic extension exercises, e.g. with 
management and staff, he assembled all reject castings for a given 
period and discussed the possible causes. As a result the reject 
rate was reduced f rom 7.8 percent to 2.3 percent. Another problem 
arose with the use of indigenous anthracite in the smelting 
process. The combustion characteristics of this material were 
found to be poor and could be improved by mixing with coke. 
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RESULTS 
6. It is clear that the results in terms of generalizable policies or 
actions for promotina technoloqical changes have been of less 
significance than the case-specific relationships and mutual 
benefits to university staff and local industry that the project 
facilitated. Very little format publishing seems to have arisen 
from the quartz crystal subproject. A local Small-Medium Industry 
Promotion Association has provided some small grants to support 
further work with the foundry industry. Professor Ki-Sul'Lee has 
had some small problem-solving contracta with local firms. He 
submits the findings of these to the Associaton which then 
distributes them to other firms in the ares. 
7. Although the legacy of project activities is still evident, there 
remain questions about the effective existence of the Regional 
Adaptive Technology Centre. It certainly no longer has a physical 
location in the university. The point was made about the leverage 
that IDRC exerted : because of the Centre's funding and reputation, 
other agencies were willing to provide funds for research 
activities. The question remains whether IDRC stayed long enough 
to ensure that sufficient momentum had been generated. 
